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*Des/P*

25 August 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey: The Turkish General Staff has notified more than 3,400 field-grade officers in all services of their retirement effective 20 August. This is a substantial proportion, probably more than half, of the total. Nearly 90 percent of general and flag officers were retired in early August.

*no*

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### III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

- A. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.]
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.] *W*
- C. [The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future:]

[Although Laotian Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi have agreed to broad guidelines for negotiating a settlement of military and political problems, the negotiations themselves could break down over any of a number of points. The Pathet Lao has called for all Laotians to support the Souvanna Phouma regime and has reportedly strengthened its military position in the Vientiane area. There is still no evidence of Chinese Communist or North Vietnamese intentions to intervene overtly. Communist prospects in Laos have been enhanced since the Kong Le coup.]

25X1

25 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

LATE ITEM

\*Laos: Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma claims that the agreement he has reached with General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup forces, has the "full" support of Captain Kong Le. If Souvanna's claim is true, the major obstacle to implementation of the Souvanna-Phoumi accord has been removed. Souvanna has provided further details of the agreement to Ambassador Brown indicating that the prime immediate consideration of both parties is to insulate Vientiane from any military threat which might be posed by the Communist Pathet Lao insurgents. Souvanna expects to have the security of Vientiane assured by the weekend, but in this as in other aspects of the situation he may be over-sanguine. After the military situation is clarified, Souvanna expects the formation of a "national union" government which would exclude Pathet Lao representation.]

(Page 3)

OK

25 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200480001-1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Situation in Laos

25X1

[Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma told Ambassador Brown in Vientiane on 24 August that the steps on which he and General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup forces, have agreed to resolve the crisis in Laos have the "full" support of Captain Kong Le, whose second paratroop battalion triggered the crisis by its takeover of Vientiane two weeks ago. No word has as yet been received directly from Kong Le, but if Souvanna's claim is true, a major obstacle to implementation of his accord with Phoumi has been removed. Souvanna added that Col. Sourith, the respected commander of Laos' airborne troops, would return to Vientiane shortly to resume control over the second paratroop battalion. Sourith would probably be an important influence inclining Kong Le toward acceptance of the agreement, if the latter has not already accepted.]

[In outlining to the ambassador his version of the understanding with Phoumi, Souvanna indicated that the prime immediate consideration of both sides was to insulate Vientiane from any military threat which might be posed by the Pathet Lao insurgents. General Ouane, the armed forces commander, is said to be reorganizing the command of the forces in the capital and to be establishing defenses against the Pathet Lao. Such defenses, however, would also be effective against the Phoumi forces should the agreement fall through. Meanwhile, the arms previously distributed to civilian partisans by Kong Le are, according to Souvanna, being recovered by the second parachute battalion, after which the unit is supposed to withdraw to its barracks, about ten miles from Vientiane. In addition, normal communications between all military regions have been reestablished.]

[Pending completion of these security arrangements, Phoumi will retain forces at Paksane, about 100 miles east of Vientiane. Elements in the strength of about two battalions were reported to have arrived there from southern Laos a day or two ago. As soon as Phoumi receives word from Ouane that the security of Vientiane is reestablished, he will withdraw these units to their home bases.]

25X1

[Souvanna expects these security arrangements to be completed by the weekend, but in this as in other aspects of the situation he may be oversanguine.]

[After the military situation is clarified, Souvanna expects the formation of a "national union" government in which he may or may not be prime minister. He plans to propose in any event that the new government offer the Pathet Lao reintegration in the national community--but not participation in the new government--provided they lay down their arms. He feels that this approach would place the onus on them for any continuation of the civil war, and he claims that Phoumi has agreed to this tactic.]



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